## AMENDMENTS TO THE CLAIMS

- 1. (Currently Amended) A cryptographic method, including:
  - generating, at a first entity, a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific;
  - receiving, at the first entity, a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
  - generating, at the first entity, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating, at the first entity, a first session key  $K_B$  and a first secret  $S_B$ , the first session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the first session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - encrypting, at the first entity, a first random nonce  $N_B$  with the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result;
  - encrypting, at the first entity, the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random nonce; transmitting the encrypted random nonce from the first entity to the second entity; receiving a response to the encrypted random nonce; and authenticating through determining whether the response includes a correct modification of the first random nonce  $N_B$ .
- (Canceled)
- 3. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein authenticating through determining whether the response includes a correct modification includes: checking whether a received modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> equals a modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> applied by the first entity.
- 4. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said authenticating includes: checking whether a received modification of the first random nonce less a modification thereof as applied thereto by the first entity equals the first random nonce.

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- 5. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein generating the first session key K<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - generating a first random number  $R_{\mbox{\scriptsize B}}$ , and
  - computing the first session key  $K_B$  from the second public key  $M_A$  raised to the exponential power of the first random number  $R_B$ , modulo a parameter  $B_B$ .
- 6-7. (Canceled)
- 8. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining the second public key  $M_A$  and the first public key  $M_B$  with a first password  $P_B$  to produce a first result, and
  - hashing the first result with a secure hash.
- 9. (Original) The method of claim 8 wherein the secure hash is a one-way hash function.
- 10. (Original) The method of claim 9 wherein the one-way hash function is one of the Secure Hash Algorithm, the Message Digest 5, Snefru, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Hash, and the Gosudarstvennyl Standard.
- 11. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining a first password P<sub>B</sub> and at least one of the second public key M<sub>A</sub> and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> to generate a first combined result, and
  - combining the first combined result and at least one of the second public key  $M_A$ , the first password  $P_B$ , and the first public key  $M_B$  to generate a second combined result.
- (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> is encrypted using a symmetrical encryption algorithm.

- 13. (Original) The method of claim 12, wherein the symmetrical encryption algorithm is one of the Data Encryption Standard and the block cipher CAST.
- 14. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1 wherein encrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> includes superencrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub>.
- 15. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 14, wherein superencrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> includes: encrypting the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> with the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to produce the first encrypted result; and encrypting the first encrypted result using the first session key K<sub>B</sub>.
- 16. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 15 wherein said authenticating includes: decrypting the response using the first session key K<sub>B</sub> to generate a first decrypted result; and decrypting the first decrypted result using the first secret S<sub>B</sub>.
- 17. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 1, wherein the response includes a combination of a second random nonce N<sub>A</sub> and a modification of the first random nonce; and wherein the method further includes: extracting the second random nonce N<sub>A</sub> from the response; modifying the second random nonce N<sub>A</sub> to obtain a modified second random nonce; encrypting the modified second random nonce using the first session key K<sub>B</sub> and the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted package; and transmitting the encrypted package from the first entity.
- 18. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 17 wherein said encrypting the modified second random nonce includes: generating a string of random bits I<sub>B</sub>; encrypting a combination of the string of random bits I<sub>B</sub> and the modified second random nonce using the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to generate a first result; and

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- encrypting the first result using the first session key K<sub>B</sub>.
- 19. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 17 wherein the encrypted package is transmitted for authentication of the first entity in opening a two-way communication channel.
- 20. (Currently Amended) A computer readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system to perform a cryptographic method including:
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific;
  - receiving, at the first computer system, a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first secret S<sub>B</sub> using a combining function f<sub>B</sub>
    on at least a first password P<sub>B</sub>, the first public key M<sub>B</sub>, and the second public key
    M<sub>A</sub>;
  - generating, at the first computer system, a first session key  $K_B$ -and-a-first secret  $S_B$ , the first session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the first session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - encrypting, at the first computer system, a first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
  - encrypting, at the first computer system, the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
  - transmitting the encrypted random nonce from the first computer system to the second computer system; and
  - authenticating through determining whether a response to the encrypted random nonce includes a correct modification of the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub>.
- (Currently Amended) A distributed readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system and a

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- second computer system to perform a computer cryptographic method through a network, the method comprising:
- generating at the first computer system a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific;
- generating at the second computer system a second public key  $M_A$ , the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
- receiving at the first computer system the second public key MA;
- generating, at the first computer system, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_{A_a}$ :
- generating at the first computer system a session key  $K_B$  and a first secret  $S_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- generating at the first computer system a first random nonce NB;
- encrypting at the first computer system the first random nonce N<sub>B</sub> with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
- encrypting at the first computer system the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
- transmitting the encrypted random nonce and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> from the first computer system to the second computer system to establish the session key at the second computer system;
- receiving at the first computer system from the second computer system a response to the encrypted random nonce; and
- authenticating the second computer system at the first computer system through determining whether the response includes a correct modification of the first random nonce  $N_{\rm B}$ .
- 22. (Currently Amended) A computer system for performing a cryptographic method through a network, the computer system comprising:
  a processor;
  - a network interface coupled to the network and coupled to the processor, the network

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interface to receive a request including information on a user identification; and a storage device coupled to the processor, the storage device to store a user password corresponding to the user identification, and wherein the processor is to perform a method, including:

- receiving a second public key  $M_A$  through the network interface, the second public key  $M_A$  being session specific;
- generating, at the first computer system, a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on at least a first password  $P_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- generating a first session key  $K_B$ -and a first secret  $S_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- generating a first public key  $M_B$ , the first public key  $M_B$  being session specific; generating a first random nonce  $N_B$ ;
- encrypting the first random nonce  $N_B$  with the session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain a first encrypted result;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the session key  $K_B$  or the first secret  $S_B$  to obtain an encrypted random nonce;
- transmitting the encrypted random nonce and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> through the network interface;
- authenticating through determining whether a response to the encrypted random nonce includes a correct modification of the first random nonce.
- 23. (Previously Presented) The computer system of claim 22 wherein the network is a network operating according to a hypertext transfer protocol; and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> is transmitted with the encrypted random nonce for session key exchange.
- 24. (Currently Amended) A cryptographic method, comprising: receiving at a first entity a second public key M<sub>A</sub> and an encrypted second random number;

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- generating a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on at least a first password  $P_B$ , a first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ :
- generating a first session key  $K_B$ -and a first secret  $S_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
- decrypting, using the first secret  $S_B$  at least a first password  $P_B$ -and the first session key  $K_B$ , to retrieve a second random number  $N_A$  from the encrypted second random number:
- modifying the second random number N<sub>A</sub> to obtain a modified second random number; encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random package; and transmitting the encrypted random package from the first entity.
- 25. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, wherein said decrypting includes: decrypting the encrypted second random number using the first session key K<sub>B</sub> to generate the first decrypted result; and decrypting the first decrypted result using at least a first password P<sub>B</sub> and the second public key M<sub>A</sub>.
- 26. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24 wherein said generating the first session key K<sub>B</sub> includes: generating a first random number R<sub>B</sub>, and computing the first session key K<sub>B</sub> from the second public key M<sub>A</sub> raised to the exponential power of the first random number R<sub>B</sub>, modulo a parameter β<sub>B</sub>.

27-28. (Canceled)

- 29. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 27-24 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes: combining the first public key M<sub>B</sub> with the first password P<sub>B</sub> to produce a first result, and hashing the first result with a secure hash.
- 30. (Original) The method of claim 29 wherein the secure hash is a one-way hash function.
- 31. (Original) The method of claim 30 wherein the one-way hash function is one of the Secure Hash Algorithm, the Message Digest 5, Snefru, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Hash, and the Gosudarstvennyl Standard.
- 32. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 27-24 wherein said generating the first secret S<sub>B</sub> includes:
  - combining the first password P<sub>B</sub> and the first public key M<sub>B</sub> to generate a first combined result, and
  - combining the first combined result and at least one of the second public key  $M_A$ , the first password  $P_B$ , and the first public key  $M_B$  to generate the first secret  $S_B$ .
- 33. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, wherein said encrypting the modified second random number includes superencrypting the modified second random number.
- 34. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 24, further including: generating a first random number N<sub>B</sub>; and wherein said encrypting the modified second random number includes: encrypting a combination of the first random number N<sub>B</sub> and the modified second random number.
- 35. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 34 which further includes: receiving at the first entity a response to the encrypted random package; decrypting the response to obtain a combination of a string of random bits and a modified

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first random nonce; and

- retrieving the modified first random nonce from the combination of the string of random bits and the modified first random nonce;
- determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified from the first random number N<sub>B</sub>.
- 36. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 35 wherein said determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified includes:
  - checking whether the modified first random nonce equals a modification of the first random nonce as applied to the first random nonce by the first entity.
- 37. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 35 wherein said determining whether the modified first random nonce was correctly modified includes:
  - checking whether the modified first random nonce less a modification thereof as applied thereto by the first entity equals the first random nonce.
- 38. (Currently Amended) A computer readable storage medium containing executable computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system to perform a cryptographic method including:
  - receiving at the first computer system a second public key M<sub>A</sub> and an encrypted second random number;
  - generating a first secret  $S_B$  using a combining function  $f_B$  on at least a first password  $P_B$ , a first public key  $M_B$ , and the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - generating a first session key  $K_B$ -and a first secret  $S_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret  $S_B$ , both the session key  $K_B$  and the first secret  $S_B$  being computed from the second public key  $M_A$ ;
  - decrypting, using the first secret S<sub>B</sub> at least a first password P<sub>B</sub> and the first session key

    K<sub>B</sub>, to retrieve the second random number N<sub>A</sub> from the encrypted second random number;
  - modifying the second random number NA to obtain a modified second random number;

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- encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key KB or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key KB or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random package;
- transmitting the encrypted random package from the first computer system for authentication.
- (Currently Amended) A distributed readable storage medium containing executable 39. computer program instructions which, when executed, cause a first computer system and a second computer system to perform a cryptographic method through a network, the method including:
  - receiving, from the second computer system and at the first computer system, a second public key MA and an encrypted second random number;
  - generating a first secret  $S_R$  using a combining function  $f_R$  on at least a first password  $P_R$ . a first public key MB, and the second public key MA;
  - generating a first session key  $K_B$  and a first secret  $S_B$ , the session key  $K_B$  being different from the first secret S<sub>B</sub>, both the session key K<sub>B</sub> and the first secret S<sub>B</sub> being computed from the second public key  $M_{\Lambda}$ ;
  - decrypting, using the first secret Spat least a first password Pp, to retrieve a second random number NA from the encrypted second random number;
  - modifying the second random number NA to obtain a modified second random number; encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key KB or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
  - encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key K<sub>B</sub> or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random package;
  - transmitting the encrypted random package from the first computer system to the second computer system.
- 40. (Currently Amended) A computer system for performing a cryptographic method through a network, the computer system comprising: a processor;

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- a network interface coupled to the network and coupled to the processor, the network interface to receive a request including information on a user identification; and a storage device coupled to the processor, the storage device to store a user password associated with the user identification, and wherein the processor is to perform a
  - generating a first public key M<sub>B</sub>;

method, including

- receiving a second public key MA and an encrypted second random number through the network interface;
- generating a first secret S<sub>B</sub> using a combining function f<sub>B</sub> on at least a first password P<sub>B</sub>, a first public key M<sub>B</sub>, and the second public key M<sub>A</sub>;
- generating a first session key K<sub>B</sub>-and a first secret S<sub>B</sub>, the session key K<sub>B</sub> being different from the first secret S<sub>B</sub>, both the session key K<sub>B</sub> and the first secret S<sub>B</sub> being computed from the second public key M<sub>A</sub>;
- decrypting, using the first secret S<sub>B</sub> at least a first password P<sub>B</sub> and the first session key K<sub>B</sub>, to retrieve the second random number N<sub>A</sub> from the encrypted second random number;
- modifying the second random number NA to obtain a modified second random number:
- encrypting the modified second random number with the first session key KB or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain a first encrypted result;
- encrypting the first encrypted result with the other one of the first session key KB or the first secret S<sub>B</sub> to obtain an encrypted random package; transmitting the encrypted random package through the network interface.
- 41. (Previously Presented) The computer system of claim 40 wherein the network is a network operating according to a hypertext transfer protocol; and the first public key MB is transmitted for session key exchange before the encrypted second random number is received.

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